Money for Nothing: The Budget Is Priced for a Decade That’s Gone

Follow the Budget's housing money: £4.7bn for buyers, £1.5bn for the social sector, and next to nothing for the SME builders the National Housing Bank was built to fund.
View From The Top, Issue 48: Money for Nothing, Dire Straits

From View From The Top, 11 November 2026

The Budget was designed for the decade that’s gone. It’s not just misdirected — it’s mispriced.

On Monday I told you 5.96% isn’t high — it’s actually below the 300-year average. Today, follow the Budget’s money and you’ll see the real problem.

On Monday I made an unfashionable claim: the rates in that remortgage letter coming to many households aren’t a crisis. The Bank of England’s records run back to 1694, and across three centuries money has averaged roughly 6 to 7 percent at the bank mortgage counter. So, in the round, today’s 5.96% is actually normal. The anomaly was 2009 to 2021 — the cheapest money in recorded history — and an entire generation of developers, lenders, investment managers and underwriting models priced their world off it and now find themselves challenged.

Yet houses were built, developments were developed, people bought houses — and my parents would have thought that was a great rate.

Here’s what nobody has said yet.

Every housing programme in last week’s Budget is built on that cheap-money logic — subsidise the buyer, lean on the volume builders, assume finance flows. That finance machine worked, but barely, at 1%. At the 300-year normal, it does something different. Follow the pound.

THE £4.7 BILLION — MONEY THAT CHASES PRICES

Your First Home programme: 2.5% deposits, a 20% government equity loan, new-builds only, from Spring 2027. It will be popular. It will help real families at the lower end of the market.

And we know exactly what it will do, because we’ve run this experiment before — Help to Buy put £29 billion of subsidised demand into a market that couldn’t build fast enough, and the government’s own evaluation found where it went: into prices and the margins of the volume housebuilders. Zoopla reckons this version carries half the old scheme’s firepower — maybe 30,000 buyers a year.

But subsidised demand into constrained supply doesn’t create homes. It reprices the ones that exist and transfers to the taxpayer a slice of the inflation it caused.

Meanwhile the OBR quietly cut its housing forecast by 190,000 homes the same day. One hand gave 30,000 buyers a ladder; the other took 190,000 homes off the table. Merry Christmas.

But note the chemistry: Help to Buy at least operated in a 2–3% mortgage world, where subsidised demand met cheap supply finance. This version pours demand subsidy into a now 6% world where the supply side can’t fund at all. Same policy, worse chemistry. It creates an even greater structural demand imbalance.

THE £1.5 BILLION — MONEY THAT GOES TO THE WRONG BALANCE SHEETS

Here’s the rebuttal I’ve heard: “But they gave £1.5 billion to supply!” So follow that pound too… where does it go? It tops up the Social and Affordable Housing Programme — grant funding, roughly £150,000 a home, for about 10,000 homes focused on social rent. Yes, worthy. And needed. But structurally incapable of reaching the problem, because of who’s allowed to touch it: the money flows through Homes England as capital grant to registered providers — housing associations — and council housing departments. They, in turn, procure from major contractors or take Section 106 units off the volume builders’ schemes.

The SME developer doing twenty units in Shropshire or Leeds? He can’t bid. He’s not a registered provider. The builders who delivered four in ten of Britain’s new homes in the late eighties — down to one in ten today — are not slow in this queue. They are not even in the queue. There is no queue for them.

So the honest arithmetic of the Budget isn’t three pounds for buyers against one pound for builders. It’s £4.7 billion for buyers, £1.5 billion for the social sector’s balance sheets, and zero for the private mid-market builder. Not a smaller share. I think, zero.

THE £16 BILLION — THE BANK THAT LENDS TO EVERYONE ELSE

Which brings me to what was meant to help: the National Housing Bank — the institution created in March, with £16 billion and an explicit mandate to back SME housebuilders, precisely because everything above routes around them. Eight months in, here is the complete list, from what I’ve found, of what it has committed (I’m happy to be corrected, by the way):

  • £100 million — investment partnership with Aviva, announced at launch
  • £100 million — equity into Long Harbour’s single-family rental fund
  • Up to £70 million — the Fiera Real Estate/Packaged Living single-family rental fund, announced this week
  • £35 million of loans across three schemes: £14 million to a Scarborough Group/Metro Holdings joint venture in Salford, £10 million to Tikehau Capital in Orpington — and £11 million to Pickstock Homes in Ludlow

That last one matters, because Pickstock is the only SME housebuilder on the list — and one Homes England was already backing, as I understand it. Add it up: roughly £305 million deployed, about 2% of the war chest. Of which the amount reaching the bank’s own named constituency — SME builders — is £11 million. Seven hundredths of one percent of £16 billion.

Understand what’s happened here, because it isn’t laziness. It’s the path of least resistance: an insurer, two institutional fund managers, a €40 billion asset manager — these are the easiest counterparties in finance. One big cheque, one diligence process, done. The £3 million loan costs as much to underwrite as the £30 million one, so the £30 million one gets done — that is the exact market failure the bank was built to fix, I think. The path of least resistance runs straight through the institution that was supposed to close it off.

And notice what it’s actually buying: equity in single-family rental funds. Even the state’s own bank, handed £16 billion and a mandate, found it easier to become a landlord than to fund a builder. At normal rates, everyone retreats to the easy ticket.

The bank is lending. Just not to the builders it was built for.

HARD LANDING

The hard truth of the week isn’t Thursday’s quarter point. It’s that the quarter point was a return to normal sea level, and most of this industry — and all of this government’s housing policy — still has its eyes and expectations calibrated to the flood.

The borrowers who pencil at 6% are real borrowers; the ones who don’t were creatures of the historic anomaly. Same test for policy: a scheme that only works at 1% money wasn’t a housing policy, it was a rates trade. So as we head into the holidays, mark your book, and your Red Book, to the world as it is — because this is the world. It was here for three hundred years before 2009, and it’s back.

NEXT WEEK

The 2026 vintage: why the hardest year to build may turn out to be the best year to lend — reset land, honest valuations, and sponsors with scar tissue.

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About the author
Paul Oberschneider

Paul Oberschneider is Chairman of Hilltop Credit Partners and Hilltop Property Partners. He has spent 30 years building real estate platforms, including an integrated property company across six Central and Eastern European markets from 1991 to 2008: 10,000+ residential units, 4 million sq ft of commercial and hospitality assets, one full exit. Today he aligns institutional capital with regional operators in UK residential. Based between London and Sotogrande.

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